instrumental. Thus, it is commonly supposed that a weak, or 'enlight anthropocentrism can support only a weak, or shallow, environmental one in which non-human nature only has instrumental values, and some interests are sacrificed only for the sake of more enlightened ones rath for nature's sake. Against such common supposition, Onora O'Neill has a that anthropocentrism, or rather an anthropocentric ethics, can support a environmental ethics, but it will have to be one that departs from trad ethical theories.3 Rejecting the traditional rule-based and virtue-based theories, O'Neill argues for an obligations-based theory, which, she cl can serve as the foundation for a strong environmental ethics. The aim paper is to show that O'Neill's obligations-based moral theory is close to what I have elsewhere called Confucian role-based ethics and thus if it is t that the former can support a strong environmental ethics then so can th This is significant insofar as there is a considerable resistance to the id Confucian ethics can support a strong environmental ethics precisely b of its anthropocentric assumptions. The only problem is that, as I wil O'Neill's obligations-based moral theory fails to support a strong environ ethics. However, this does not mean that the Confucian role-based ethi also fail in this regard. Indeed I will show that the latter provides a cor for the deficiency found in O'Neill's account and will serve as a more foundation for a strong environmental ethics.
Before proceeding, the question 'Why Confucianism?' needs to be add as it is bound to be raised by those not predisposed to take Confucianism se Indeed, those who associate Confucianism with China might say that tu to Confucianism for environmental inspiration is a mistake given the h images and stories of environmental degradation coming from China, s lakes covered in green algae, cities shrouded in smoke and haze, childre from toxic factory discharges and so on. One response to such criticism is is not the Confucian beliefs that contribute to the current environmental p in China, but rather the economic policies pursued by the government, are designed to attain maximum short-term growth. If anything, given th claims about Confucianism below are correct,the solution to those environm problems lies in China returning to its core Confucian beliefs. Another r is that given the scale of the global environmental crisis, no source o should be neglected. Yet another is the practical question of encouraging with one fifth of the world population, to enter the environmental deb to support global environmental initiatives. Without the participation of few, if any, globally significant environmental initiatives can succeed, a demonstrated at the recent Copenhagen meeting. To secure such partici in perspective and Confucianism may provide a radically new angle to rethink environmental issues. In any case, Confucianism could well complement and enrich western thoughts. Indeed, it is precisely the aim of this paper to show how we can appeal to Confucianism to strengthen O'Neill's argument for the environmental credentials of anthropocentrism.
O'NEILL'S OBLIGATIONS-BASED ETHICS
As noted earlier, environmental philosophies such as biocentrism, ecocen
and Deep Ecology are 'strong' in the sense that they claim that some of interests may have to be sacrificed for the sake of the environment. One w underpinning such aclaim is to attribute to nature a value that exists indepen of humans, respect for which may call for the sacrifice of some human int humans have an extensive range of entrenched interests, the interests of a let alone those of non-living things, may be sacrificed in the trade-off utilitarianism not only permits but also officially encourages.
That leaves deontology. However, instead of the typical rights-base proach, O'Neill argues for an obligations-based approach. The trouble w the rights-based approach is that it requires a robust notion of moral a which, in any plausible formulation, is likely to leave out non-sentient rights. An obligations-based ethics is indeed strongly anthropocentric b only humans have obligations. Nevertheless, it can serve as a foundation strong environmentalism if among the obligations that humans have are tions to the environment, which require us to sacrifice some of our intere the sake of the environment. If those obligations can be identified, we what we ought to do for whom. Furthermore, an obligations-based ap does not exclude non-sentient nature, not even the isolated and disper ments of the environment, insofar as it is possible to specify obligations t aspects of nature. The key question, then, is how to identify, or specify, h obligations to nature as a whole.
As an immediate objection to O'Neill's approach, it may be said that a gation is just a counterpart of a right. However, O'Neill argues that whil obligations do have counterpart rights, there are many obligations that have counterpart rights at all (and conversely). The one-to-one correspo between obligations and rights applies more in the case of legal obligatio rights but less so in the case of moral ones. In support of O'Neill's cla According to O'Neill, since our obligations to the environment are in nature, they are fundamental obligations rather than institutional. Be damental, they must be based on principles that are not just universalisa also can 'be accepted and adopted (not necessarily discharged) by all ag (p. 135). A universalisable principle (e.g. taking the bus to work) will n accepted and adopted by all agents if any of its alternatives (e.g. taking the to work) is also universalisable (O'Neill's own example: fasting by d fasting by night). However, when a principle is universalisable and none alternatives is then the universalisable must be adopted as obligatory (a alternative must be rejected O'Neill goes on to identify a principle that serves her purpose, namely th principle of rejecting the commitment to injure because it is universalisable a its only alternative, the commitment to injure, is not. For O'Neill, rejecting t commitment to injure is a fundamental human obligation. To discharge th obligation, a human society must develop institutions designed to minimis injury to persons. Since we can be injured by living in a degraded environmen we have an obligation not to damage the environment:
... if the rejection of systematic or gratuitous injury to other agents is a funda mental obligation, then it will also be obligatory not to damage or degrade the underlying powers of renewal and regeneration of the natural world. The basic thought here is that it is wrong to destroy or damage the underlying reproductive and regenerative powers of the natural world because such damage may inflict systematic or gratuitous injury on some or many agents (p. 137).
Since the 'reproductive and generative powers of the natural world' are no confined to sentient creatures, our obligations extend beyond them. From he we can argue for an extensive and far-reaching protection of the natural wor Should strong environmentalists be satisfied? Unfortunately, no principled strong environmentalist should be. The amount of protectionforthe environment that we end up with is not a selling point for an ethics that promises to serve as a foundation for a strong environmentalism. What needs to be kept in mind is that a strong environmentalism is committed to the view that, where necessary, human interests have to be sacrificed for the sake of the environment. To put it differently, strong environmentalism is committed to the view that some aspects of the non-human natural world have a non-instrumental value which may have to be preserved at some cost to human interests. O'Neill's obligations-based ethics does not deliver on this score. The aim of the principle of non-injury is to protect human agents, and the protection of nature is called for only in the service of this aim. Recall O'Neill's own words: it is wrong to destroy or damage the underlying reproductive and regenerative powers of the natural world because such damage may inflict systematic or gratuitous injury on some or many agents' (p. 137). It may be a strict requirement not to destroy or damage the natural world, but the protection of the natural world is only instrumental to the avoidance of 'systematic or gratuitous injury on some or many agents'. It follows that the natural world, or some aspects of it, may be destroyed or damaged if no injury to any agent will result. Surely, there must be some as pects of the natural world, the isolated and remote ones, that will fall into this category. Indeed, as O'Neill herself concedes, certain harms to animals, such is useful to note first that O'Neill's obligations-based ethics is close enough i structure and in its anthropocentric assumptions to Confucian ethics, which have argued elsewhere as best understood as a role-based ethics.
CONFUCIAN ROLE-BASED ETHICS
For many commentators, Confucian ethics is a kind of virtue ethics, give emphasis on virtues such as ren, yi and li. The trouble with this view is t the Confucian texts also speak of strict moral rules that one ought to foll either because they are entailed by certain duties, or because following th has desirable consequences, such as a harmonious world. However, Confu ethics is best understood as neither a virtue ethics nor a rule-based ethics as an ethics in which virtues and rules fall out of an understanding of the as constituted by the roles determined by the relationships in which a pe stands. If Confucian ethics is based on anything, it is based on the roles t make an agent the person who he or she is. It is a role-based ethics.
To read Confucian ethics as a virtue ethics or a rule-based ethics is to ascribe to Confucianism a conception of the moral agent very different from the Confucians conceive of a moral agent. To be sure, there is a disagreement am commentators about what this is. However, a plausible account is Chenya Li's, according to which the 'Confucian... self is not an independent agent happens to be in certain social relationships'.6 Rather, the self 'is constit of, and situated in social relationships' (ibid.). The Confucian self does ha an identity, but this identity is not arrived at, or defined, independently of society in which the self finds itself. Rather, the self defines itself in term the social roles it occupies in the society. The society, in turn, is constitute distinct individual selves acting in different roles. Roger Ames and David have helpfully employed the focus-field metaphor to characterise the relation between the individual self with the social network of relationships in wh it finds itself. For Hall and Ames, the Confucian self is a focus in that 'it constitutes and is constituted by the field in which it resides', the 'field of so activity and relations '.7 For Confucians, social relationships are characterised by social roles, a the latter are defined in terms of obligations. To each role is attached a se obligations, and to be in a role is to be under a set of obligations, the impo ones being encoded in the rites, li. To be in a social relationship, then, is to st under certain obligations. It follows that the Confucian self, being 'constit of, and situated in social relationships', is defined in terms of a set of s obligations. Thus, I am who I am by virtue of standing in a network of so relationships, a father to A, a husband to B, a friend to C, a citizen of D, so on, and being a something entails that I owe them certain things, suc is done all will be well. Thus, Confucius said that 'when the father is the son is son, the elder brother is elder brother, the husband is husba the wife is wife, then the family is in proper order. When all the families proper order, all will be right with the world.'8 The rectification of name process of learning to be true to the self that one already is, which is to b to the names that describe the social relationships in which one stands.
accept the roles entailed by such relationships and to play these roles p by discharging specific duties and obligations and cultivating specific v To be true to the self that one already is, is to be sincere. This is why ing to be sincere is equally stressed by the Confucians. Indeed, this is th process as self-cultivation, although the stress here is on the outcome themselves. I will show that it is precisely this difference that allows Confuci ethics to overcome the deficiency found in O'Neill's ethics, a deficiency that as I have argued, prevents the latter from serving as a foundation for a stron environmentalism. In particular, I will show, in Section 4, that since Confuci anthropocentrism is based on a particular conception of the self, it can be inclusive of the non-human world and provides ample conceptual space for the non-human world to be attributed with a value of its own, one that is n subordinate to human interests. the following principle can be plausibly stated: C = Commit oneself to live by the roles with which one identifies one's self (or by which one conceptualises one's self)-We can now follow O'Neill's own procedure and argue that C is the fundamental universal principle that grounds Confucian ethics and give the obligations therein their normative force. To do so, we need to show that is universalisable and its negation is not.
That C is universalisable is almost self-evident. If my reading of Confucian ethics above is correct, no Confucian self is thought of as anything other than someone who stands in a network of social relationships. Since social relatio ships are defined in terms of social roles, to commit oneself to live by those roles, or to cultivate oneself into those roles as Confucius and Mencius would put it, is a requirement for all Confucian agents. Insofar as the roles themselve are understood in terms of specific obligations and responsibilities, moral and otherwise, C certainly has a normative force, or reason for acting, or being, a O'Neill (and Korsgaard) would say. Indeed, it can give those not predisposed to Confucianism a reason for acting because C does not depend on how the roles themselves are actually conceived -how to be a father or a son, a teacher or Such non-Confucians can in fact follow a line of influential western thinkers which include Dorothy Emmet, who grounds duties and obligations in social relationships, and Charles Taylor, who takes social relationships to be the main 'sources of the self' in general, and the moral self in particular.11 None of thes authors would accept all the details of the Confucian account of what it is to b a father, or a son, or generally someone in a certain role. Indeed, these authors and the Confucians, may be said to go beyond O'Neill in identifying the no mative source of moral principles, locating it in our reflections on our selves a persons standing in networks of social relationships and on the obligations and responsibilities we take on as such persons. In any case, there is no reason t deny that C is a reason for acting whether or not I succeed in my argument below to show that it is a reason for everyone. Returning to Confucianism, Confucian believe that all agents are capable of observing C, even though different thinkers have different views about how difficult it is to do so. They further believe, a we have seen, that all will be well, that there will be universal harmony, if we al successfully observe C. Not only that there is no conceptual difficulty with th idea of everyone adopting C, or willing it to be a universal law, thus satisfyin the Kantian criterion for universalisability, there will be an optimal outcome i everyone adopts and abides by C.
As pointed out earlier, universalisability by itself is not sufficient according to O' Neill. For C to be a fundamental moral principle, it has to be universal, not jus universalisable. For C to be universal, the negation of C, namely the commitment to live by the roles with which one identifies one's self ( which one conceptualises one's self), has to be shown to be not universali This is harder to establish, but a plausible argument can be given. Thus, w it may be possible for an isolated individual to reject the commitment to by his or her roles, such as a father or a son to refuse to act as a father or a such rejection, or Not-C, cannot be willed to be a universal law without ru into conceptual difficulties or practical absurdities. Differently put, since roles arise from networks of social relationships, they are inter-connected that playing a certain role requires others to play corresponding, or matc roles. For me to play the role of a teacher, or a sovereign, requires others to the role of a student, or a subject, and so on. Thus, for me to exist as a Conf self, I cannot will that others adopt Not-C. Thus, Not-C is not universalis As above, this point applies also to non-Confucians, if O'Neill's arguments her obligations-based ethics is accepted, particularly when they are bolst by attempts by Emmet, Taylor, Smiley and others to ground moral obliga in social roles in much the same way Confucians do. In any case, the impo thing is that Not-C is not universalisable in terms of O'Neill's obligationsethics, which has to be presupposed since the main point of this paper is to that Confucian role-based ethics can overcome adeficiency in O'Neill's argu Now, since the non-universalisable Not-C is the negation of the universal C, following O'Neill, we have a fundamental obligation to adopt C, whic the ground of all other obligations that go with social roles.
The crucial difference between O'Neill's obligations-based ethics and
Confucian role-based ethics is now clear: in the former, obligations are grou in the principle of rejecting the commitment to injure while in the latter, th based on C, or the commitment to play certain social roles, or to be sinc a Confucian self. O'Neill has argued, problematically as we have seen, th the principle of rejecting the commitment to injure can serve as the bas a strong environmental ethics. The question now is whether C can do a b job. I believe it can. All that is needed is the acceptance that the self, essen social as it is, is part of a larger community with its own moral standing as such there can be human social obligations to that larger community f own sake. One idea found in all of the strong environmental philosophi the idea that humans are part of a larger biotic community, one in whic are members as much as other living things are, and as members, we a dependent in various ways on the non-living environment. This is facilitated if not clearly implied in principle C, given my reading of Confucian eth role-based ethics. Thus, in Confucianism, a person who learns to conceptu the self as a relational self and who has done so will be much more read make the necessary step to extend the network of relationships beyond w social toward the nonhuman elements. We are here reminded of the Con process of self-cultivation as one that begins with the individual and then ex Environmental Values 20.4 outward to the family, then to the community and finally to the world. W there is no explicit mention, in the Confucian writings, of an extension be the human world, the Confucian idea of extending the self can itself be e extended to reach the nonhuman world. Indeed, it may be said that such ex sion is logically implied insofar as the Confucian path of extension is mean follow the grooves of the dao, and insofar as Confucians understand that path of the dao leads beyond the human world. Furthermore, the Confucian is equipped with xin, or heart-mind, the 'heart' element of which is affec giving the Confucian agent the capacity to empathise with the rest of nat
As for the 'mind' element, it is arguable that the network of social relation is meant to be extendable to include the nonhuman world, that social rites rituals, or li, are meant to be extendable to include obligations towards a responsibilities for the environment. There is enough evidence to suggest for the Confucians, social relationships can be fostered in a favourable nat environment and harmed in adverse ecological conditions. Indeed, social r tionships may be said to be logically continuous with ecological relationshi
Thus, the traditional social obligations and responsibilities imply, or at least be extended to include, those pertinent to the environment. The social li ca seen as continuous with, or incorporating the ecological li. It is li not to po the environment and not to waste natural resources, it is li to respect nonhum living things and to protect the ecological systems that support them and s
The Confucian saying 'Let the father be father, the son be son ...' implies, at least can be extended to include 'Let the citizen be citizen', where 'citi is understood as citizen of a biotic community. It may be said that there is no direct evidence for such extension, let al implication, in the Confucian writings. However, if the claims above conce ing the Confucian account of the human-nature relatedness are correct t the extension of Confucian role-based ethics to include roles regarding, he obligations to, non-human nature, or the biotic community, is justified. Ind some commentators have argued that Confucianism is at least compatible w the widest possible extension of the self to something akin to the 'Self' of Ecology. Thus, according to Tu Wei-ming, Confucianism is best described 'anthropocosmic' rather than simply anthropocentric ,12 In Section 4 below, I
present my own version of the Confucian 'anthropocosmic' view. Borrow from Tu, Mary Evelyn Tucker has argued that the Confucian conception of self can be interpreted in such a way as to show that Confucianism is compati with the fundamental tenets of Deep Ecology.13 In particular, Tucker claims t 'Confucians would agree' that'nature has inherent value' (p. 130), a claim will be explicitly supported in Section 4 below. instance, as a piece of investment). The question is whether non-human na only has a value that is purely instrumental to humans (insofar as we value it the basis of human needs and preferences), or whether it can also have a n instrumental value. The latter can be either an inherent value, which depends there being human valuers, or intrinsic, which is totally independent of hum In their outright rejection of anthropocentrism, or in attributing intrinsic va to nature, biocentri sm, eco-centrism and Deep Ecology are' strong' environm philosophies, calling for the sacrifice of some of the human interests, inclu the enlightened ones, for the sake of the environment. The question is whe it follows that an environmental ethics cannot be strong unless it rejects an pocentrism outright, or attributes intrinsic value to nature. Given the distin above between intrinsic and inherent value, there can be an environmental et that accords to nature an inherent value, which also calls for the sacrifice of of the human interests in respecting nature's inherent value, while denying t it has intrinsic value. Such an ethics would be anthropocentric insofar a Tu, 'the Chinese ... subscribe to the continuity of being as self-evidentl (p. 106). He goes on to say that 'the notion of humanity as forming one with the universe has been so widely accepted by the Chinese ... that it c well be characterised as ageneral Chinese worldview' (p. 113). In the pap earlier, Tu describes this Chinese worldview as 'anthropocosmic', a vie allows for a development of 'more comprehensive environmental ethics'
As pointed out then, the 'anthropocosmic' nature of this worldview suppor claim that the obligations of the Confucian self as a self that stands in a n of social relationships can be extended to include obligations to the noncommunity. Tu points out that the harmony that Confucians are comm attaining is the 'Great Harmony' that encompasses all of nature (p. 111) terminology of the environmental debate, this might be called the great h of the biotic community. This is not to say, of course, that human identity in the cosmic whole: Tu insists that 'the human being ... is unique' and well-known Confucian who says that 'human beings alone ... receive [th Agents] in their highest excellence ' (p. 115) . This is consistent with my here that the Chinese view is deep-down anthropocentric, but I have sho its anthropocentrism can support a robust environmental ethics.
If I am right in my characterisation of Confucian ethics, it is plausi conclude that the anthropocentrism embedded in it is distinct from the anthropocentrism that attributes to non-human entities only an instru value. To be sure, some commentators, such as O'Neill, have argued that a enough environmentalism can be constructed on the basis of the ascrip nature of a value that is instrumental to our well considered preferen borrow Norton's terminology), such as the preference not to 'inflict sys or gratuitous injury on some or many agents', which requires that we 'destroy or damage the underlying reproductive and regenerative pow the natural world' (p. 137). However, the strength of such environme is contingent on the link between the preservation of the 'reproducti regenerative powers of the natural world' and the avoidance of 'systema gratuitous injury' to human agents. Such link logically implies that ther need to protect and preserve, let alone respect and revere, the natural w the welfare of human agents is not at stake. Those environmentalists wh this thought disturbing may wish to lookfor a different kind of anthropoc Environmental Values 20.4 
